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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether exporting firms pay average higher wages than non-
exporting firms by analyzing a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms in 2004. 
Through rigorous exercises involving robust regressions, quantile regressions and 
nonparametric matching estimators, we find that the wage premium of exporting activities 
is not a prevailing phenomenon in China. It is unevenly distributed among firms with 
different ownerships, export-orientations and locations. Overall, exporters located in 
coastal regions but Guangdong province are more likely to pay higher average wages than 
nonexporters, while those producing in Guangdong offer a lower pay.  
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1 Introduction 
The rise in inequality, whether measured in income, wages, or wage premia, has been 
observed in both developed and developing countries over the last three decades (Wood, 
2002; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). According to the prediction of the traditional 
Hecksher-Ohlin theory, the opposite should be expected to happen in developing 
countries following major trade reforms. This contradiction has led many economists to 
drop trade as a candidate for explaining rising inequality and look for other factors, such 
as skill-biased technological change, immigration, unions and others. However, recent 
evidence at the firm level and developments of theoretical models incorporating firm 
heterogeneity of firms and workers and labour market imperfections have renewed 
research on this important link between trade and inequality (e.g. Egger and 
Kreickemeier, 2009; Helpman et al., 2010).  
One of the most important insights from the recent studies is that the potential 
effect of trade on wage inequality is reflected in the wage gap between exporters and 
nonexporters. A large number of studies with firm level data from different countries 
have shown the existence of exporter wage premia, that is, exporting firms pay higher 
wages than firms supplying the domestic market only.1 As pointed out by Baumgarten 
(2010), this wage gap can affect total wage inequality over time via two channels. First, 
the share of employment at exporting firms may change due to the expansion of existing 
exporters or the entry of new exporters. Second, the size of the wage differentials itself 
may change because of increasing internationalization. Therefore, examining the wage 
differentials between exporters and nonexporters could help us understand the role of 
trade openness in the widening wage inequality.  
                                                 
1
 For a survey of the literature, see Schank et al. (2007). 
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Although the exporter wage premia have been found in many countries, there is 
little information about Chinese enterprises. The present paper aims to fill this gap by 
exploring whether exporters pay average higher wages than nonexporters in China. The 
empirical analyses are based on a very rich enterprise census dataset covering all 
Chinese manufacturing enterprises in 2004. China is particularly interesting since it is 
not only the largest developing country with abundant low-cost labour but also a major 
trading nation in the world. Since the implementation of the ‘open-door’ policy in the 
early 1980s, China’s exports grew from $14 billion in 1979 to $1,578 billion in 2010, 
while the ratio of exports to GDP increased from 0.06 to 0.26. In 2010, China overtook 
Germany to become the largest merchandise exporter. Since 1979, along with the rapid 
growth in national income and export volume, China also has witnessed rising wage 
inequality (Xu and Li, 2008). According to a recent report by OECD (2010), the Gini 
coefficient of per capita income in China between 1993 and 2008 increased by 24%, 
which was higher than that in India (16%), South Africa (4.5%) and OECD countries 
(5.5%).  
This study contributes to the growing literature on the exporter wage premium. 
It differs from previous studies in two ways. First, we provide new evidence from the 
perspective of a large open developing country at the firm level. As much of the existing 
empirical research has been carried out either in developed countries or small 
developing countries, a case study of Chinese firms would be unique and hence add to 
the existing literature. Second, we pay particular attention to the role of firms’ 
ownership and location in analysing exporter wage premium. In the existing papers, 
multinational enterprises of different country origin and locally owned enterprises of 
different ownership are treated as a whole. In contrast, this study breaks down the data 
by ownership of foreign and domestic investors and allows for the exporter wage 
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premium to vary across firms of different ownership. We also carefully consider the 
influence of firms’ location on the premium, for we believe that firms located in 
different provinces could behave differently due to variations in resource endowments 
and local government policies.  
Our empirical regressions reveal the following three main findings. First, 
exporting firms except for those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) are more 
likely to pay higher average wages than their nonexporting counterparts in general, 
although the magnitude of the wage gap varies according to the distribution of wages as 
demonstrated by the results of quantile regressions. Second, the wage premia of 
exporters are more likely to be associated with firms producing for both foreign and 
domestic markets while those exporting only tend to pay a lower average wage. Third, 
exporting firms located in east China are more likely to offer a wage premium, while 
those based in Guangdong offer lower average wages than nonexporters. It is also found 
that exporting firms operating in Jiangsu province pay higher average wages than 
nonexporting firms.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review 
of the theoretical concepts and empirical literature. This is followed by a discussion of 
the modeling issues. The data issues and preliminary analysis are described in Section 4 
with Section 5 discussing the empirical results. The final section presents the conclusion.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical concepts 
The theoretical explanation for the effect of trade on wages and wage disparity 
originates from the standard Hecksher-Ohlin trade model or more precisely the Stopler-
Samuelson theorem. The latter implies that trade increases income inequality in rich 
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countries and reduces income inequality in poor countries. This conclusion is at odds 
with the reality. Many economists recently thus try to relax the assumptions of the 
traditional trade models, such as frictionless labour markets, identical firms, 
homogenous workers and free mobility of workers within a country.  
The new theories based on the heterogeneous firm trade model by Melitz (2003) 
provide insights into the effect of trade on income and wage inequality. One of the 
theories is the so-called fair-wage model along the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1990). 
Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) introduced labor imperfections into a heterogeneous-
firm trade model by means of a fair wage-effort mechanism. In their framework, 
workers care about receiving ‘fair wages’ and whether the wages are considered to be 
fair by workers depends on the economic success of the firm where they are working. 
The fair-wage preferences lead workers to feel entitled to be paid higher wages when 
they work at more productive and profitable firms. Otherwise, workers would withhold 
their efforts. Exporting firms that are more productive and profitable than nonexporting 
firms then pay higher wages in the equilibrium. The equilibrium of this framework 
hence features wages that differ from firm to firm, and also, in general, positive 
unemployment.  
A second heterogeneous-firm approach to trade and wage inequality was 
proposed by Helpman, Istkhoki and Redding (2010). They introduced searching and 
matching frictions and employer screening into the Melitz-type model. In their 
framework, because of hiring cost, workers outside a firm are not perfect substitutes for 
workers currently employed, and employed workers are able to bargain for a share of 
profits. Workers are ex-ante homogenous but receive a firm-specific ability draw. The 
complementarities between employees’ abilities and firm productivity provide the 
incentive for firms to screen workers. More productive firms which would select to 
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export screen more intensively to exclude those with lower ability and hence have 
workforces with higher average ability. Since higher-ability employees are more costly 
to replace, more productive firms thus need to pay higher wages. Trade liberalization 
would allure more productive firms into exporting, which further enhances their 
incentive to screen workers. Based on this logic, exporters would have workforce with 
higher average ability than nonexporters and hence pay higher wages. 
Another related approach is explored by Davis and Harrigan (2007), who offer a 
shirking model. They use the monitoring approach of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). If a 
worker has distaste for effort and firms imperfectly monitor worker’s effort, higher 
wages make the threat of being fired when caught shirking more credible. In their 
approach, firms differ from each other not only in the marginal product of labor as in 
Melitz model, but also in the probability of detecting a shirking worker in any on period. 
This implies that the average wage paid varies from firm to firm, with firms that are 
good at catching shirkers paying low wages and firms that are bad at catching shirkers 
paying high wages. Accordingly, if a worker’s effort is more valuable to or less 
perfectly monitored by an exporting firm, this model will also offer an underlying 
mechanism for an export wage premium. For example, Verhoogen (2008) proposes the 
quality-upgrading mechanism linking trade and wage inequality in developing countries. 
It states that more productive exporters produce higher-quality goods than less 
productive nonexporters, and they pay higher wages to maintain a higher-quality 
workforce. The other possibility is that modern technologies are worse at monitoring 
effort than traditional technologies, and hence the exporting-induced adoption of 
modern technologies hypothesized by Yeaple (2005) leads to higher efficiency wages. 
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2.2 Empirical evidence  
The exporter wage premium has been supported by a large body of empirical literature 
on both developed and developing countries although the estimated premium varies 
across the countries. For example, there is empirical evidence from the United States 
(Bernard and Jensen 1995), Germany (Bernard and Wagner 1997), and the United 
Kingdom (Greenaway and Yu 2004). The derived positive wage premia in these studies 
range from 2.6% to 6.4%. In these empirical exercises, the authors all ran the 
regressions of average annual wage against the exporter status, controlling for capital 
per worker, firm size, age, location and other firm-specific characteristics.  
The studies on developing nations also show positive wage premia and the 
premia appear to be larger than those in developed countries. For instance, Alvarez and 
Lopez (2005) find an exporter premium of 21% for average wages in Chile. Similarly, 
Van Biesebroeck (2005) finds exporter wage premia for Sub-Saharan African nations 
are statistically significant and about 40% for average wages after controlling for 
country, year, industry, location and plant size. However, some authors point out that 
the preceding studies could overstate the wage premia without controlling for individual 
worker characteristics or skill structure of workforce within firms (Munch and Skaksen, 
2008). This is because the wage gap between exporters and nonexporters may result 
from either exporting activities or the different types of employment between them.  
More recent models are able to differentiate the exporter wage premia for 
workers with different skill levels or take employment characteristics into account. Tsou 
et al. (2006) found positive exporter wage premia for skilled workers and a negative 
export-wage premium for unskilled workers in Taiwanese manufacturing firms. 
Hansson and Lundin (2004) also found wage premia for skilled workers in Swedish 
manufacturing firms. A growing number of studies use matched employer-employee 
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data to control for worker attributes in addition to firm characteristics in analysing 
exporter wage premia. For instance, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2007) used a large 
dataset linking manufacturing firms and workers from Germany between 1995 and 1997 
and they showed that the wage premia become smaller when observable and 
unobservable characteristics of the employees and workplaces were controlled for. They 
also found a higher exporter wage premium for blue collar workers than that for white 
collar workers. Munch and Skaksen (2008) linked the exporter wage premia to the use 
of human capital in Danish exporting firms and found the existence of exporter wage 
premia only in the export-intensive firms with workers who have higher levels of 
education. Breau and Rigby (2006), in contrast, failed to find wage premia of exporting 
firms in Los Angeles of the U.S. after controlling for worker characteristics such as age, 
gender, education, race, and nationality.  
Despite the fact that China has experienced a sharp increase in wage inequality, 
its causes at the micro level are underdocumented. Using Chinese urban household 
survey data, Zhao (2001) investigates the effects of foreign direct investment on wage 
inequality. Using a sample of 1,500 firms in five cities in China for the period 1998-
2000, Xu and Li (2008) attribute the county’s fast growing income inequality to the 
rising demand for skilled labour. They show that export expansion had a negative direct 
effect on skill demand and a positive indirect effect via skill-biased technologies. The 
net effect is estimated to account for 5% of the rising skill demand of the sampled firms. 
In a recent paper, Chen et al. (2011) investigate the link between foreign direct 
investment and inter-firm wage inequality. Their results imply that the wage level and 
growth rate in multinationals are significantly higher than those in domestic firms. 
Furthermore, their findings show that the presence of foreign-invested enterprises 
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discourages wage growth in domestic firms, and thus enlarges the wage gap between 
foreign and domestic firms.  
3 Modeling Issues  
3.1 The Model  
We aim to test whether exporting firms pay higher average wages than nonexporting 
firms. Following the best practice in the literature, we consider a standard Mincerian 
wage function:  
i 1 i 2 i 3 i i
4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
8 i 9 i j ij k iik
w = α +β Exp +β For +β Exp For
+β LP +β Size +β Age +β KL
+β Fem +β Skill + δ Province + Industry + εϑ
×
∑ ∑
                  (1) 
where iw  denotes the logarithm of the average wage in enterprise i. iExp  denotes the 
firm’s exporting status, which equals one if its records show positive exports in 2004 
and zero otherwise. iFor is an ownership dummy that is equal to one if the firm is 
foreign-funded (including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan-funded), taking domestic 
firms as the base group. To capture the differences in exporter-wage premia among 
foreign firms and domestic firms, we add an interaction term between exporting status 
and foreign firms. iLP is the labour productivity, which is defined as the logarithm of 
output per worker. iSize is the logarithm of total assets of enterprise i. iAge  represents 
the firm’s business history since its establishment. iKL is the capital-labour ratio which 
is defined as the net value of fixed assets divided by the number of employees in firm i. 
iFem  is the share of the number of female workers over the total number of employees. 
iSkill  is the skill composition of the employees in enterprises i, and is measured by 
three variables: the proportion of employees with a graduate education (18 years of 
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education and over), the proportion of employees with a college education (16 years of 
education), and the proportion of employees with a high school education (12 years of 
education). According to the existing studies, iFem  is expected to have a negative 
impact on the average wage and the skill composition has a positive impact due to the 
skill premium (Chen et al., 2011). ijProvince  is a province dummy that is equal to one if 
enterprise i is located in province j , and zero otherwise, and is supposed to capture 
region-specific wage differentials. ikIndustry is an industry dummy that is equal to one 
if firm i operates in industry k, and zero otherwise, and is expected to reflect industry-
specific wage differentials. α  is a constant and iε is the error term.  
3.2 Estimation Issues 
Given firm level cross-sectional data considered here, we first use Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to estimate the wage equation (1). We are aware that adopted regression 
analysis might not be appropriate because of possible omitted variable biases 
(Wooldridge, 2000, p.91). Therefore, the results of OLS regression analyses should be 
interpreted with caution. The estimated coefficient 1βˆ  represents the wage premium of 
domestic exporters, while the sum of the estimated coefficients 1 3(β +βˆ ˆ ) measures the 
wage differentials between foreign exporters and foreign nonexporters. The above 
analysis could suggest a relationship between wage level and exporting status.  
However, we notice that the main concern of the OLS regressions is that the 
average wage gap is not representative of the wage differentials among different 
quantiles of the wage distribution. For instance, if more talented and high-ability 
workers would tend to be hired by exporting firms, average wage of exporting firms 
would be driven up and the export-wage premia would be overestimated. To identify 
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the effects of unobservable ability of workers on wages, the use of quantile regression 
analysis has become increasingly popular in labour economics particularly in studies of 
wage differentials with respect to education, gender and working condition (Choi and 
Jeong, 2007). Following this practice, we use quantile regressions to examine the 
possibility that the impact of exporting activities on average wages could vary as the 
distribution of the dependent variables (wages) changes.   
The quantile regression was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). In 
contrast to the OLS method which provides information only about the effect of 
regressors on the conditional mean of the dependent variable, the results of quantile 
regression analysis give parameter estimates at different quantiles,τ  . Thus, the results 
of quantile regressions could give us a more detailed picture of the exporter wage 
premium in China.  Formally, our quantile regression model is: 
'
i τ i τi
'
τ i i τ i
w = β X + u
with Q (w | X ) = β X (i = 1,2,..., n)                                        (2) 
where iw is the vector of log wage, 
'
τβ is a (Kx1) parameter vector, iX  is a (Kx1) vector 
of covariates, 
τiu stands for the error term and τ i iQ (w | X ) denotes the thτ conditional 
quantile of iw given Xi. Note that τ τi iQ (u | X ) = 0  for all i. For a givenτ , the quantile 
regression estimator of τβ is a solution to  
' '
i τ i i τ i
' '
i τ i i τ i
w β X w <β X
1
min τ w -β X + (1- τ) w -β X
nβ ≥
  
 
  
∑ ∑                      (3) 
As τ  increases from 0 to 1, one can trace the whole distribution of iw  condition on Xi. 
The coefficient estimates of a quantile regression denote the effect of covariates on the 
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distribution of the regressor at the corresponding quantile, thus giving us a means to 
compare distributions.   
A further issue is related to the possible endogeneity problem of the exporting 
activity. The orthogonal assumption between exporting dummy and the error term in the 
OLS estimator could be violated if some omitted variables lead export participation and 
average wage to move in the same direction. The most convenient way to control for the 
omitted variable is to use panel data approaches (fixed effect or random effect) by 
assuming the omitted variables are time-invariant and hence treating them as part of the 
error term. However, it is impossible here due to the use of cross-sectional data. An 
alternative way to deal with endogeneity is to find instrument variables (IVs) that are 
assumed to be orthogonal to the error term. Unfortunately, in most cases, these IVs are 
either hard to come by or they are weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. 
Although Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested using GMM-style IVs out of 
endogenous variables, we still cannot use this method to deal with cross-sectional data. 
Nevertheless, we can make use of a non-parametric matching method to find the wage 
differentials between exporting firms and nonexporting firms. The method compares the 
average wages of exporters with those ‘matched’ nonexporters. Matching is based on 
the similarity in observed characteristics of the firms. One of the main advantages of the 
matching method is that it does not require the specification of any functional form of 
the outcome equation and is therefore not susceptible to misspecification bias. 2 
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper is drawn from the First National Economic Census 
conducted by National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2004. To the best of our 
                                                 
2
 Please see Abadie et al. (2004) for the details about matching method and STATA module.  
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knowledge, the census provides the most comprehensive cross-sectional enterprise data 
available in China. The basic statistics included in this dataset are summarized in the 
China Economic Census Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2006). We 
only have access to the data for the manufacturing sector, and our analysis thus focuses 
on this sector only. The database not only covers the whole population of Chinese 
manufacturing firms but also provides rich information for each firm, such as export 
sales, geographic location, the year of establishment, ownership, total assets, and total 
employment. More importantly, it reports detailed information about the workforce by 
education and gender, which enables us to examine the impact of skill intensity and 
gender structure on average wages. After cleaning the observations with missing values 
for the key variables, we obtained a sample of 879 thousands firms for our analysis.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables employed in this paper 
together with a breakdown by exporting status and types of ownership.  Exporting firms 
on average pay 15.3% higher than nonexporting firms. Yet, it is shown that the foreign 
exporters pay less than nonexporters when we break the whole sample into domestic 
firms and foreign firms. However, the average wages of foreign firms are found to be 
much higher than those of domestic firms. The descriptive statistics also reveal that 
exporters are larger than nonexporters in terms of total employment, sales and total 
assets. With respect to the capital-labour ratio, exporters are on average more capital-
intensive while foreign exporters are less capital-intensive. Surprisingly, we notice that, 
contrary to the popular perception, exporting firms are shown to be less productive in 
terms of output per worker. One possible explanation is that most exporters in China 
tend to specialize in labour-intensive activities. When comparing the employment 
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structure, we notice that exporters tend to employ more female workers. Both domestic 
and foreign exporters have employed less skilled labour in terms of the educational 
attainments of their employees, although the differences among local firms are rather 
small.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
An overview of the distribution of the exporting firms by their export intensity, 
measured by the ratio of the value of exports over that of sales, is presented in Figure 1. 
In our sample, only 5.5 per cent of the firms were involved in exporting activities. 
However, over a half of the exporting firms sold 100 per cent of their outputs abroad. 
This number is even higher for foreign firms (66%) and a little bit lower for domestic 
firms (43%). This distribution is significantly different from the manufacturing firms in 
the United States. Bernard et al. (2003) reports that two-thirds of the US exporters sell 
less than 10 per cent of their output overseas, and fewer than 5% of them export more 
than 50 per cent of their outputs.  
[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here] 
Are exporter wage premia systematically different across the industries and 
regions? Figures 2 and 3 provide the answer. It is shown that exporter-wage premia 
measured as the mean differences in log wages between exporters and nonexporters 
exist in all industries and vary moderately. While the largest wage gap is observed in 
the tobacco industry, the smallest seems to be in the leather and cultural product 
manufacturing sector. At the provincial level, there is substantial variation in the wage 
gap.  The largest wage gap between exporters and nonexporters is observed in Beijing, 
the capital city, which is followed by Yunnan province, a major tobacco production 
center in the country. However, exporting firms pay less than nonexporting firms in 
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Guangdong province. The latter is the largest manufacturing center in China and 
accounts for over one third of the country’s total exports. These findings may imply that 
the variations in exporter-wage premia are highly correlated with firms’ location rather 
than the industries which the firms are associated with.  
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Baseline regressions 
Table 2 reports the baseline regression results. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the average wage for each firm. The Huber-White sandwich estimator was used to 
correct for possible heteroskedasticity. Regression (1) in Table 2 reports results from a 
simple model with three explanatory variables, namely, export dummy, foreign firms 
dummy and their interaction term. The benchmark category is the domestic non-
exporters. The coefficient of export dummy is positive and significant, and the positive 
sign indicates that ceteris paribus domestic exporters pay higher wages than domestic 
nonexporters. The coefficient on foreign enterprises dummy is also positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. Thus there is a foreign wage premium. These results 
are consistent with the finding of the existence of a significant foreign wage premium in 
previous studies (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004; Chen et al., 2011). The coefficient of the 
interaction term between export dummy and foreign firms dummy is significantly 
negative and its absolute value is larger than the coefficient of export dummy, indicating 
that the foreign exporters pay less than foreign nonexporters. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In regression (2), we include four control variables: labour productivity, firm 
size, firm age and capital intensity. The adjusted R-squared increase substantially. The 
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coefficients of the export dummy, foreign dummy and their interaction term decrease a 
little, which provides evidence that firms characteristics account for part of the wage 
gap between exporting firms and non-exporting firms. Given that wage levels vary 
enormously across industries and regions, we introduce 28 two-digit industry dummies 
and 30 provincial dummies alternatively in regressions (3)-(5). The wage gap changes 
marginally once we control for the industrial influences, while it changes dramatically 
after controlling for the firms’ locations.  
Our conclusions drawn from regressions (1)-(5) may be spurious. An exporting 
firm could pay higher due to intensive employment of skilled workers. To take this 
issue into consideration, we extend the specification to control for the skill composition 
and the share of female workers. The estimation results are reported in columns (6) and 
(7) in Table 2 and the main findings remain the same. The proportion of skilled labour 
has a significantly positive effect on wages, suggesting that more skill-intensive firms 
have higher average wages. The proportion of female workers is negatively associated 
with the average wage level. This confirms again that there is a significant gender wage 
differential in China. For other firm characteristics, namely, the labour productivity, size, 
age and capital intensity are positively related to wage levels, indicating that larger, 
older and more productive and capital-intensive firms offer higher wages. In column (7), 
we run a robust regression to handle the possible influence of outliers.3 But the results 
do not change. Domestic exporters on average pay 2.4% more than nonexporters, while 
foreign exporters pay 3.8% less than nonexporters.  
                                                 
3
 We have used the "robust regression" employed by Stata command “rreg”. It works iteratively first by 
performing a regression calculating weight based on residuals and then using these weights for further 
regressions until changes in weights drop to a certain level. Hamilton (2008, p.253) states “Robust 
regression methods aim to achieve almost the efficiency of OLS with ideal data and substantially better 
than OLS efficiency in non-ideal (for example, non-normal errors) situations”. 
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The classification between domestic firms and foreign firms may be overly 
simplistic in China. As it is well known, foreign firms in China are divided into two 
groups, namely, those originated from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (thereafter, 
HMT) and those originated from western countries, mainly OECD countries (thereafter, 
OECD). These two groups differ enormously in terms of motivation and investment 
behaviour. The HMTs are concentrated in light industries and textile projects using 
labour-intensive technology, while OECD investors are more interested in the market-
seeking type of investment motivated by their ability to provide differentiated products 
to Chinese market. Within domestic ownership category, state-owned enterprises 
(thereafter, SOE) behave quietly differently from non-state owned enterprises 
(thereafter, Non-SOE). It is argued that SOEs enjoyed higher earnings than the non-
SOEs due to the government’s support and protection of the former. 4   
To examine the exporter-wage premia across different ownership categories, we 
classify the sampled firms into eight categories: OECD exporters and nonexporters, 
HMT exporters and nonexporters, SOE exporters and nonexporters, and Non-SOE 
exporters and nonexporters. The results from this set of regressions with the non-SOE 
nonexporters as the base group are reported in Table 3. It is shown that exporter-wage 
premia do not exist among HMT-invested firms. HMT exporters on average pay 7% 
less than HMT non-exporters. This may also explain why exporters in Guangdong 
province generally pay less than nonexporters. Among the sampled firms, we find that 
57% of the HMT-invested firms are located in Guangdong and they account for 56.6% 
of the exporting firms there.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
4
 Buckley, Wang and Clegg (2007) provide useful discussions of the different characteristics of firms 
with different ownerships.  
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5.2 Results of the quantile regressions 
The advantage of the quantile regressions over the OLS method has been well 
documented. First, quantile regressions are more robust to the outliers than the OLS. 
Second, the quantile regressions can provide parameter estimates at different quantiles, 
not just the conditional mean. Therefore, it provides information on the variation in the 
effect of independent variables at different quantiles. It is worthy to mention that 
quantile regressions are not the same as the application of the OLS method to the 
subsets of the data produced by dividing the whole sample into different percentiles of 
the independent variables. For each quantile regression, the whole sample is used with 
some observations being weighted more than others.  
Before running our regressions we tested the normality of the wage variable. We 
used the skewness and kurtosis tests of D’Agostino et al. (1990) to statistically show (at 
the 1 per cent level of significance) that the dependent variable is positively skewed and 
leptokurtic (skewness=55.41 and kurtosis=16634.11). Skewness and kurtosis tests for 
the natural logarithm of average wage also show statistically significant departures from 
normality; the p-values of the skewness and kurtosis tests are smaller than 0.01. These 
results show that the distribution of the dependent variable significantly departs from 
normality and justify our choice of the quantile regression method.  
To explore the differences in exporter wage premium across the groups with 
different ownership, we also divide the whole sample into eight groups as in Table 2, 
taking domestically-oriented non-SOEs as the base group. Thus the exporter wage 
premium for each group equals the difference in the coefficients of exporters dummy 
and nonexporter dummy. If the coefficient of the exporter dummy is greater than that of 
the nonexporter dummy, it provides evidence that exporting firms pay higher wages 
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than nonexporting firms. Otherwise, it indicates the exporters pay less. In Table 4, we 
reported the results of quantile regressions at the following five quantiles: 0.10, 0.30, 
0.50, 0.70 and 0.90. The null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across and 
between pairs of quantiles is rejected at the significance level of 5 per cent. It thus can 
be concluded that there are statistically significant differences among the estimated 
quantile regression parameters.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Comparing the coefficients of the exporter dummies and nonexporter dummies, 
we first notice that exporter wage premia are present across the entire conditional wage 
distribution among the OECD firms, SOEs and non-SOEs except for the HMT firms as 
shown in Table 5. Second, the wage premium of SOE exporters is relatively large but it 
decreases as one moves from the lowest quantile to the highest quantile of the 
conditional wage distribution. This means that SOEs with lower wages have higher 
wage premia of exporting activities. The exporter wage premia of SOEs are more 
pronounced at the lower tail of the conditional wage distribution. Third, the HMT 
exporters always show a wage discount ranging from -2.8 to -16.0 per cent as one 
moves up to the upper tail of the conditional wage distribution. Finally, it is shown that 
OECD exporters and non-SOE exporters always have positive wage premia but the 
premia remain relatively stable across quantiles varying between 1 and 5 per cent. To 
investigate the sensitivity of the findings observed in Tables 4 and 5, additional quantile 
regressions were run and the estimated coefficients at these quantiles are graphically 
presented in Figure 4. These plots indicate that the patterns observed in Tables 4 and 5 
are robust to changes in the quantiles. 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 4 here] 
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5.3 Robustness Checks 
5.3.1 Alternative measurement of variables 
In the preceding sections, we only use the average wage as the dependent variable. It is 
common knowledge that Chinese firms also pay employees non-wage benefits such as 
payment for unemployment insurances, medical care insurance, old-age pension funds 
and housing subsidies, we thus use the total income measured as the sum of basic wage 
and non-wage benefits as the dependent variable in this section.  
Besides using the alternative measurement of the dependent variable, we also 
consider using different measurement of exporting activity according to their export 
intensities. We have noticed that about half of the exporting firms sold all of their 
outputs overseas. It is expected to see some differences in wages between those 
exported partly and fully. Therefore, we divided the exporting firms into two categories: 
full exporters with 100 percent export intensity (the ratio of exports in total sales) and 
partial exporters with export intensity less than 100 percent, and then run the 
regressions using the sub-samples. Before we run the regression, we compare the wage 
gap between exporters and nonexporters conditional on their export intensities. Figure 5 
shows that the wage premia, measured as the differences in the mean of the natural log 
of wages between exporters and nonexporters, vary considerably with the export 
intensity. The figure illustrates that exporter wage premium is larger for firms with 
lower export intensity than that with higher exporter intensity. Except for the non-SOEs, 
the premium falls and eventually becomes negative for other types of firms.  
[Insert Figure 5 and Table 6 here] 
The results in Column (1) of Table 6 show that the previous findings are robust 
to the alternative measurement of the dependent variable. Chinese workers working in 
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exporting firms with the exception of HMT firms could have higher income than those 
working in nonexporting firms. However, when we redefined the exporters according to 
their export intensity, we found firms selling in both domestic and foreign markets pay 
higher average wages than non-exporting firms. But, if the exporters are restricted to 
those selling all their output abroad, the exporter wage premium marginally exists 
among non-SOEs. 
5.3.2 Exporter wage premium: the role of firms’ location 
Given the vastness of the Chinese territory, it seems unlikely that exporting firms 
located in the coastal provinces behave the same as those located in the interior 
regions.5 In fact, the coastal regions have been the main source of exports and main 
recipients of FDI due to their convenient location, better infrastructure and superior 
business environment. Among the coastal regions, the geographic distribution of trade 
and FDI has also been highly uneven. So in our second robustness check, we compare 
the exporter wage premium in different regions. The full sample is first split into the 
coastal region and interior region. Then the coastal region is further divided into 
Guangdong Province and other coastal provinces (non-Guangdon). The estimation 
results are reported in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results for the firms located in the coastal region are similar to those from 
the baseline regressions. Exporting firms except for the HMT exporters pay higher 
average wages than nonexporting firms. However, we find that the wage premium of 
HMT exporters in the interior region also becomes positive. For the exporting firms 
producing in Guangdong province, however, only SOEs show positive exporter wage 
                                                 
5
 The coastal region includes Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang. The interior region includes all other provinces.  
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premia and other three types of firms show a negative wage premium. Meanwhile, we 
find that the exporting firms in “other coastal” provinces (non-Guangdong) show a 
similar pattern as those located in the interior region and tend to pay higher wages than 
non-exporting firms.  
What makes Guangdong so special? This result may be attributed to its position 
in China’s foreign trade and its mode of exporting. In the last two decades, this province 
contributed to over a third of China’s total exports. Whether it is a toy or electronic 
gadget, if a product bears the ‘Made in China’ mark there is a fair chance it comes from 
Guangdong. However, more than two thirds of the provinces’ exports are processed 
goods from textiles to machinery, and profit margins are very small. Another 
characteristic is that exporting was mainly carried out by multinationals through the 
processing trade. In 2004, processing trade generated 76 per cent of the province’s 
exports and it also accounted for 44.4 per cent of the country’s processing trade exports. 
Compared with those focusing on the domestic market, exporting firms would take full 
advantage of the low cost and abundant labour resources in China and hence pay lower 
wages.  
5.3.3 Export wage premium: the results of matching estimators 
The literature on matching methods is vast and growing. In this part, we apply the 
Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected matching estimator to do a robustness check. The 
advantage of the matching methods is that they can eliminate sample selection bias by 
formally controlling for the non-random selection problem and avoid the specification 
of the functional form because they are nonparametric techniques (Abadie et al., 2004). 
In this paper, we refer to the exporting activity as “treatment”, to the exporting firms as 
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the “treatment group”, and to the nonexporting firms as the “control group”.6 However, 
we cannot observe both outcomes for the same individual with and without treatment at 
the same time. The matching approach is one possible way to find the control group, 
which helps to tackle this selection problem. Its basic idea is to find in a large group of 
non-participants those individuals who are similar to the participants in all relevant pre-
treatment characteristics.  
[Insert Table 8 and Figures 6-9 here] 
Given the strong influence of firms’ location on the wage level, we matched 
exporters with nonexporters using observed firm characteristics within each province. 
The average treatment effects of exporting on the average wage for each province are 
reported in Table 8 and also illustrated in Figures 6-9. Figure 6 shows that the wage 
premia of OECD exporters only exist in four coastal provinces (Hebei, Shandong, 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang) and three ethnic minority regions (Tibet, Ningxia and Guizhou). 
Figure 7 illustrated the existence of wage premium for HMT exporters. We can find that 
HMT exporters in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian are more like to pay higher wages than 
their nonexporting counterparts, while those producing in Guangdong province offer 
lower wages to workers. For state-owned enterprises, the positive exporter wage 
premium only holds for those located in Jiangsu province. It may suggest that exporting 
activity does not affect the wage level of SOEs. In Figure 8, we find that non-SOE 
exporters located in east China and northeast China pay more to workers than 
nonexporters, while they pay less when they are in Guangdong province. An 
explanation of this result is that firms with different ownerships located in difference 
provinces were conducting different mode of exports.  
                                                 
6
 All of the analysis is implemented by the use of the nnmatch module in STATA (Abadie et al, 2004). 
This programme estimates the average treatment effects either for the overall sample or for the subsample 
of treated or control units using nearest neighbour matching estimators.  
23 
 
6 Conclusion 
Using the firm-level census data of Chinese manufacturing industries in 2004, this paper 
examines the wage premium of exporting activity. In addition to using robust 
regressions, we also employ quantile regressions and non-parametric matching 
estimators. Moreover, we carefully consider the role of firms’ ownership, export 
intensity and location in determining the exporter wage premium. Our main empirical 
results may be summarized as follows. First, exporting firms except for those from 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) are more likely to pay average higher wages 
than their nonexporting counterparts in general, although the size of wage gap varies 
according to the distribution of wages as demonstrated by the results of quantile 
regressions. Second, the wage premia of exporters are more likely to be associated with 
firms that supply both foreign and domestic markets, while the firms that shipped all 
their products abroad tend to pay lower. Third, exporting firms located in east China are 
more likely to offer a wage premium while those producing in Guangdong tend to offer 
lower wages than nonexporters. Among all the cases, workers in Jiangsu province could 
benefit from firms’ exporting activities as all exporting firms operating in the province 
pay higher average wages than nonexporting firms.  
Overall, our results show that exporter wage premium is not a consistent 
phenomenon in China. This may imply that the relationship between globalization and 
wage inequality within a country is far more complex. The benefit of globalization is 
unequally distributed among firms and provinces, which would inevitably cause wage 
inequality both between and within regions. We note that for decades Chinese 
government has been promoting FDI inflows and exports to stimulate economic growth. 
However, the distributional effect of trade liberalization might not be positive.  
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This study has a number of limitations which represent opportunities for further 
research. The first one is related to the cross-sectional nature of the study which relies 
on one single year data (2004). It is thus impossible to discuss the direction of causality 
between wages and exporting decision. We do not know whether exporters pay higher 
wages because they are exporters or they paid higher wages before they started 
exporting. If data are available in the future, a longitudinal approach should be adopted 
so that the time dimension and dynamics of exporter wage premium could be 
considered. Second, due to the limited scope of the data, we can only discuss wage 
premium at the firm level (average wage premium). Further work is needed to 
investigate wage gaps between workers in different sectors, namely, the exporting and 
non-exporting sectors. 
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Figure 6 OECD Exporter Wage Premium across the Country 
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Figure 7 HMT Exporter Wage Premium across the Country 
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Figure 8 SOE Exporter Wage Premium across the Country 
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Figure 9 Non-SOE Exporter Wage Premium across the Country 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 Whole sample Domestic firms Foreign firms 
 Exporter Nonexporter Exporter Nonexporter Exporter Nonexporter 
Average wage  
(thousands of 
yuan) 
9.824* 
(7.119) 
8.518* 
(5.727) 
9.506* 
(6.771) 
8.438* 
(5.578) 
10.339* 
(7.623) 
11.681* 
(9.402) 
Number of 
employees 
(person) 
85* 
(378) 
26* 
(64) 
92* 
(476) 
26* 
(64) 
72* 
(87) 
41* 
(52) 
Sales 
(thousands of 
yuan) 
15,722* 
(309,437) 
2,453* 
(31,177) 
23,542* 
(393,027) 
2,457* 
(31,567) 
3,014* 
(8,399) 
2,320* 
(3,657) 
Gross capital 
(thousands of 
yuan) 
20,147* 
(341,777) 
2,679* 
(30,238) 
28,797* 
(433,140) 
2,577* 
(30,461) 
6,092* 
(37,975) 
6,700* 
(19,182) 
Capital-labor ratio 
 
59* 
(171) 
50* 
(354) 
45 
(142) 
47 
(270) 
83* 
(208) 
162* 
(1,470) 
Labour 
productivity 
(output per worker) 
94* 
(157) 
115* 
(382) 
108* 
(174) 
116* 
(386) 
71* 
(119) 
97* 
(140) 
Firm age  
(year) 
7.0 
(8.1) 
6.9 
(7.3) 
7.2* 
(9.5) 
7.0* 
(7.3) 
6.6* 
(4.7) 
5.9* 
(4.6) 
Share of female 
workers 
0.517* 
(0.250) 
0.353* 
(0.255) 
0.515* 
(0.257) 
0.350* 
(0.255) 
0.520* 
(0.240) 
0.432* 
(0.246) 
Share of 
postgraduate 
0.003* 
(0.021) 
0.002* 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
0.004* 
(0.025) 
0.009* 
(0.044) 
Share of college 
0.083* 
(0.141) 
0.075* 
(0.156) 
0.069* 
(0.128) 
0.072* 
(0.152) 
0.107* 
(0.156) 
0.190* 
(0.234) 
Share of high-
school 
0.280* 
(0.228) 
0.291* 
(0.263) 
0.271* 
(0.228) 
0.289* 
(0.263) 
0.295* 
(0.228) 
0.339* 
(0.252) 
Observations 
 (N) 48,572 841,582 30,069 820,627 18,503 20,955 
Source: Chinese manufacturing cenus 2004 (National Bureau of Statistics of China) and authors’ 
calculations.  
Note: Reported values are means (except for the last row), with the standard devisations in parentheses. 
Significance level (* p<0.01) refer to t tests with the null hypothesis that the mean differences between 
two groups (exporters vs. nonexporters) is equal to zero.  
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Table 2 Baseline regressions: OLS regressions 
 
Dependent variable: ln(average wage) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Export dummy 0.116*** 0.086*** 0.074*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0019) 
Foreign firms 0.252*** 0.234*** 0.214*** 0.179*** 0.175*** 0.151*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0023) 
Exp*For -0.200*** -0.136*** -0.129*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.072*** -0.062*** 
 
(0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0037) 
Labour productivity 
 
0.126*** 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.092*** 
  
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Firm size 
 
0.045*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
  
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Firm age 
 
-0.005*** 0.0001 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
  
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Capital intensity 
 
-0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
  
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Female share 
  
  
 
-0.066*** -0.070*** 
   
  
 
(0.0020) (0.0016) 
Graduate share 
  
  
 
0.553*** 0.410*** 
   
  
 
(0.0282) (0.0149) 
College share 
  
  
 
0.260*** 0.212*** 
   
  
 
(0.0036) (0.0024) 
High-school share 
  
  
 
0.025*** 0.023*** 
   
  
 
(0.0017) (0.0013) 
Industry dummies No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.031*** 1.216*** 1.081*** 1.447*** 1.352*** 1.347*** 1.474*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0036) 
N 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 
adjusted R2. 0.012 0.131 0.162 0.222 0.235 0.244 0.269 
Note:   The coefficients in Columns (1)-(6) are estimated using OLS methods. Standard errors in 
parentheses are corrected for heterogeneity. The coefficients in Column (7) are estimated using robust 
regression.  *** indicate a significance level at 1%.  
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Table 3 Basic wage equation: the role of ownership  
 
Dependent variable: ln(average wage) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OECD exp 0.290*** 0.271*** 0.254*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.230*** 0.191*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
OECD nonexp 0.289*** 0.263*** 0.246*** 0.232*** 0.227*** 0.195*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
HMT exp 0.095*** 0.141*** 0.109*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.022*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
HMT nonexp 0.224*** 0.221*** 0.198*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.122*** 0.093*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
SOE exp 0.557*** 0.300*** 0.283*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 0.267*** 0.281*** 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) 
SOE nonexp 0.256*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.150*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.060) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Non-SOE exp 0.099*** 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm features No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Female and 
skill share 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Province 
dummies 
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 
adjusted R2 0.018 0.133 0.164 0.225 0.238 0.247 0.274 
Note: Firm features including labour productivity, size, age and capital intensity; Female and skill 
share represented the female share of the total employees, the share of workers with graduate degrees, 
the share of workers with college degrees and the share of workers with high-school certificates.  
The coefficients in Columns (1)-(6) are estimated using OLS methods. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The coefficients in Column (7) are estimated using robust regression. *** 
indicates a significance level at 1%. 
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Table 4 Results of quantile regressions 
 Dependent variable: ln(average wage) 
 Q 0.10 Q 0.30 Q 0.50 Q 0.70 Q 0.90 
OECD exp 0.082*** 0.155*** 0.201*** 0.264*** 0.367*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
OECD nonexp 0.054*** 0.110*** 0.169*** 0.227*** 0.354*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
HMT exp 0.001 0.005 0.019*** 0.045*** 0.087*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
HMT nonexp 0.028*** 0.061*** 0.096*** 0.140*** 0.247*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
SOE exp 0.096*** 0.233*** 0.282*** 0.350*** 0.400*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) 
SOE nonexp -0.035*** 0.060*** 0.145*** 0.235*** 0.367*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Non-SOE exp 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.022) (0.003) (0.004) 
Firm features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Female and skill share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.099*** 1.361*** 1.461*** 1.593*** 1.864*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
N 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 890,154 
Rseudo  R2. 0.124 0.121 0.161 0.152 0.142 
Note: Firm features including labour productivity, size, age and capital intensity; Female and skill 
share represented the female share of the total employees, the share of workers with graduate degrees, 
the share of workers with college degrees and the share of workers with high-school certificates.  
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Table 5 Exporter wage premium across quantiles 
 
Q 0.10 Q 0.30 Q 0.50 Q 0.70 Q 0.90 
OECDs 0.028 0.045 0.032 0.037 0.013 
HMTs -0.028 -0.061 -0.077 -0.095 -0.160 
SOEs 0.131 0.173 0.137 0.115 0.033 
Non-SOEs 0.012 0.018 0.022 0.021 0.025 
Note: The exporter wage premium equals the differences in the estimated coefficients on exporters and 
nonexporters at the different quantiles.  
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Table 6 Robustness results: alternative measurement of variables 
 Ln(income) Ln(wage) 
 Whole 
sample 
Partial 
exporter 
Full 
exporter 
Partial 
exporter 
Full 
exporter 
OECD exp 0.211*** 0.269*** 0.170*** 0.245*** 0.154*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
OECD nonexp 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HMT exp 0.040*** 0.136*** 0.001 0.122*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
HMT nonexp 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SOE exp 0.309*** 0.330*** -0.032 0.301*** -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.035) (0.009) (0.034) 
SOE nonexp 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Non-SOE exp 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm features Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Female and skill share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.432*** 1.435*** 1.436*** 1.492*** 1.492*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 890,154 864,977 866,759 864,977 866,759 
 R2 0.281 0.283 0.275 0.276 0.268 
Note: Firm features including labour productivity, size, age and capital intensity; Female and skill 
share represented the female share of the total employees, the share of workers with graduate degrees, 
the share of workers with college degrees and the share of workers with high-school certificates.  
All the coefficients are estimated using robust regression. *** indicates a significance level at 1%. 
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Table 7 Robustness results: Coastal vs. Interior region 
 Dependent variable: ln(average wage) 
 Coastal region Interior region Guangdong Non-Guangdong 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OECD exp 0.190*** 0.129*** 0.046*** 0.197*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) 
OECD nonexp 0.161*** 0.092*** 0.070*** 0.165*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) 
HMT exp 0.011*** 0.064*** -0.029*** 0.199*** 
 (0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.007) 
HMT nonexp 0.093*** 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.175*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
SOE exp 0.302*** 0.265*** 0.456*** 0.300*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.013) 
SOE nonexp 0.211*** 0.099*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Non-SOE exp 0.015*** 0.029*** -0.018*** 0.055*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
Firm features Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Female and skill  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province dummies Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 1.466*** 1.197*** 1.486*** 1.298*** 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) 
N 609,383 280,771 86,367 523,016 
Note: Firm features including labour productivity, size, age and capital intensity; Female and skill 
represented the female share of the total employees, the share of workers with graduate degrees, the 
share of workers with college degrees and the share of workers with high-school certificates.  
The benchmark category is non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) that did not exported. Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. The estimates are from the estimations of robust regressions. *, ** and 
*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 8 Robustness results: matching results 
 Dependent variable: ln(average wage) 
Province code  
and name 
OECD  
exporters 
HMT 
 exporters 
SOE  
exporters 
Non-SOE 
exporters 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
11.Beijing 0.038 0.005 0.148 0.008 
12.Tianjin 0.118* 0.182 0.129 -0.035 
13.Hebei 0.152*** -0.093 0.106 0.032** 
14.Shanxi -0.062 -0.255 0.129 0.153*** 
15.Inner Mongolia -0.117 0.280 0.413 -0.062 
21.Liaoning 0.164 -0.035 0.148* 0.067*** 
22.Jilin 0.032 -0.066 0.202* 0.100** 
23.Heilongjiang -0.222 0.293 0.084 0.111** 
31.Shanghai 0.089*** 0.051 0.031 0.043*** 
32.Jiangsu 0.094*** 0.042** 0.151** 0.027*** 
33.Zhejiang 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.038 0.008** 
34.Anhui 0.064 0.152 0.119 0.012 
35.Fujian 0.055* 0.049** -0.050 0.020** 
36.Jiangxi 0.119 0.046 0.104 0.064*** 
37.Shangdong 0.074*** 0.041 0.063 0.054*** 
41.Henan -0.139 -0.025 0.084 -0.005 
42.Hubei -0.168 0.058 0.061 0.096*** 
43.Hunan 0.249 -0.117 0.039 0.019 
44.Guangdong 0.0001 -0.095*** 0.058 -0.021*** 
45.Guangxi -0.094 0.181* -0.47 0.007 
46.Hainan 0.449 -0.156 0.939* -0.077 
50.Chongqing 0.306* 0.186 0.107 -0.026 
51.Sichuan 0.192 0.048 -0.007 0.043 
52.Guizhou 0.494*** 0.272 0.091 -0.023 
53.Yunnan 0.089 -0.051 0.101 0.017 
54.Tibet 0.095*** N.A. N.A. N.A. 
61.Shaanxi 0.079 N.A. 0.144 0.026 
62.Gansu 0.253 0.371 0.303 -0.037 
63.Qinghai N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.350 
64.Ningxia 0.601*** N.A. 0.055 0.085 
65.Xinjiang N.A. N.A. 0.298 -0.054 
Note: Matching variables include labour productivity, firm size, firm age, capital-labour ratio, female 
share, graduate share, college share, and high-school share. The number of matches is two. ***, **, * 
denotes the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
